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Executive Summary 
 The sharing economy has used technology to transform how the marketplace for many 
common services now operate.  Ridesharing services in many jurisdictions throughout the world 
compete with the highly regulated taxicab industry and governments have been compelled by various 
interest groups, to intervene to tackle the regulatory uncertainty that has resulted from the entry of 
this new type of service.   The challenge for policymakers is to find a regulatory framework that 
balances the benefits of innovation and transportation choice with the potential impact on the 
taxicab industry and passengers of this unregulated business.  
This research paper is designed to present the reader with an understanding of the literature 
on policy diffusion and apply the concepts learned, to explain the proliferation of ridesharing 
regulations in Canada.    The paper chronicles the process of crafting ridesharing regulations in four 
large Canadian municipalities (Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto) and documents the similarity 
in the regulatory frameworks adopted by these municipalities to the regulatory framework in other 
North American jurisdictions where transportation network companies are regulated.   
The research shows that through the learning process regulators formulate the policy 
framework for ridesharing regulations based on a number of considerations.  Municipal regulators 
consider among other things, the success or failure of the policy in other jurisdictions, their own 
ideological preferences, the political consequences of the adoption of a particular policy as well as 
the capacity of the regulatory authority to adopt the policy.  The result is that the regulatory 
framework adopted, not only reflects the learning obtained from other jurisdictions but also that 
regulators will tailor the adopted regulations to meet their own local needs.    
 
       2  
 
Table of Contents 
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3 
1.1 The Sharing Economy ......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 The Regulatory Paradigm ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Impact of ridesharing operations on the taxicab industry ............................................................... 11 
2.0 Policy diffusion .................................................................................................................................. 15 
2.1 Definition and concepts .................................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Key concepts arising from the literature on policy diffusion ........................................................... 19 
2.3 Learning and Policy Diffusion ........................................................................................................... 22 
3.0 Regulating ridesharing in Canada ..................................................................................................... 23 
3.1 Background of Uber’s operations in Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto .............................. 23 
3.2 Edmonton’s experience .................................................................................................................... 25 
3.3 Calgary’s experience ......................................................................................................................... 26 
3.4 Ottawa’s experience ......................................................................................................................... 27 
3.5 Uber’s operation in Toronto ............................................................................................................. 28 
3.6 Similarities in the regulations ........................................................................................................... 30 
4.0 Application of the concepts from the policy diffusion literature to the ridesharing regulations in 
Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto ......................................................................................... 34 
4.1 The impact of ideology on policy diffusion ....................................................................................... 35 
4.2 Impact of political consequences on policy diffusion ....................................................................... 37 
4.3 Impact of implementation and effectiveness on policy diffusion .................................................... 38 
4.4 Impact of professional organizations and lobbying groups on policy diffusion ............................... 38 
4.5 Learning from each other ................................................................................................................. 40 
5.0 Research Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 42 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 43 
 
  
 
 
 
       3  
 
1.0 Introduction 
When governments are faced with the decision as to how to change policies or implement new 
policies, they often rely on the experiences of other governments to help inform their decision-making.   
Exploring how public policies diffuse among other governments is not new and has been studied for many 
years.  Policy diffusion has been defined as one government’s policy choices being influenced by the 
choices of other governments. 1   An area where policy diffusion is increasingly apparent is in the 
regulations governing ridesharing in North America. Ridesharing is a ride matching system that formally 
or informally links riders to drivers between the same places at the same times through the use of 
technology.2  This system relies on a mobile app and allows individuals to use their personal vehicles to 
pick up passengers.  It is a phenomenon that, within the last half decade, has presented unique challenges 
for local, provincial and state governments in North America.  Most of these challenges focus on the 
inability of governmental authorities to respond in a timely manner to this dramatic change in the urban 
transportation marketplace as well as the need to strike a balance between encouraging innovation, 
competition and providing affordable transportation options for the travelling public, while ensuring 
consumer protection and public safety.  
Ridesharing companies that rely on the use of apps to connect riders to vehicles-for-hire have 
created regulatory problems for many municipalities across North America and the world. The battles 
around the regulatory framework that should govern ridesharing services have been very public.  The 
taxi lobby has been active in getting their members to make public appeals to elected officials to 
intervene with regulations that protect the taxicab industry or to enact outright bans on the 
                                                          
1 Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2012). Policy diffusion: Seven lessons for scholars and practitioners. Public 
Administration Review, 72(6), 788-796. 
2 Schneider, A. (2015). Uber Takes the Passing Lane: Disruptive Competition and Taxi-Livery Service Regulations. 
Elements: Boston College Undergraduate Research Journal, 11(2). 
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operation of ridesharing services within their jurisdictions.  Taxi drivers in a number of municipalities 
in Canada have staged protests and sit-ins in council chambers hoping to persuade not only their 
elected officials but also the public to see the value of protecting the taxicab industry from what they 
perceive to be the predatory behaviour of these new entrants.  Elected officials who are also 
policymakers also struggle with the political consequences of taking sides in this debate, as they 
understand that embracing one side or the other could spell the end of their political careers.  They 
also understand that in this technology age, restricting innovative modes of transportation will send 
the signal that they are not allowing for market transformation that would encourage efficiency and 
increased transportation options for the public. 
It is against this backdrop that the cities of Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto have 
taken the lead among Canadian municipalities to regulate ridesharing in their respective jurisdictions.  
The timing of the enactment of these regulations and the regulatory framework adopted by these 
four municipalities suggest that policy diffusion has influenced the decision-making with respect to 
the enactment of these regulations.   The focus of this research paper is to look at the relationship 
between policy diffusion and the proliferation of ridesharing regulations in Canada.  Specifically, the 
research question deals with determining whether or not the by-laws recently passed by the 
municipal governments in the cities of Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto and Ottawa, designed to regulate 
ridesharing in their jurisdictions, are examples of policy diffusion. The research paper is structured as 
follows:  firstly, it will provide an overview of ridesharing and the rise of the ridesharing company 
Uber as the largest player in this innovative business model.  The paper will also discuss the impact 
of ridesharing operations on the taxicab industry. Secondly, as there is a large body of research on 
policy diffusion, the paper will explain the mechanisms of policy diffusion and discuss some of the 
debates in the literature on policy diffusion.  Thirdly, there will be a discussion on how these four 
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municipalities in Canada crafted regulations to deal with the ridesharing services operating in their 
jurisdictions and an assessment of how policy diffusion was a driver in the decision-making by these 
local policymakers.   Finally, the research paper will show that the regulations that are currently in 
place for these Canadian municipalities not only reflect key ideas and philosophies learned from 
municipalities in the United States but also reflect what Canadian municipalities have also learned 
from the regulatory frameworks implemented by each other.   
1.1 The Sharing Economy 
According to Andrew Bond, the sharing economy, although difficult to define, is a 
microeconomic system built around the utilization of unused human and physical resources.3    In the 
sharing economy people are connected to these unused resources through the use of technology.     
Bond provides an example of the type of activities that takes place in the sharing economy when he 
describes the sharing economy as one where, for example, an employee of Walmart, while off-duty, 
utilizes the private vehicle that she uses to commute to and from work, to take passengers to and 
from destinations in her hometown working as an Uber driver.4  Another example is where an 
individual can utilize the accommodation service, Airbnb, to rent out his Toronto condo while away 
for short periods of time.        
There are a number of companies currently operating in the ridesharing market.  These 
providers of ridesharing services include Uber, Lyft, Hailo and Sidecar.  In December 2015, Bloomberg 
estimated Uber’s value at approximately $62 billion which is larger than Ford, General Motors and 
                                                          
3 Bond, A. T. (2015). An app for that: Local governments and the rise of the sharing economy. Notre Dame Law 
Review, 90(2). 
4 ibid 
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Honda.5   Lyft, its nearest competitor, was valued by Bloomberg in 2016 at $5.5 billion.6  Since the 
launch of Uber in 2010 and as of May 2016, Uber is available in over 66 countries and 449 cities 
worldwide.7  It is because of its sheer size and reach that the taxi industry and the regulatory 
authorities in large urban centres across North America are moved to assess and make policy 
determinations about the impact of its operations within these cities.  This paper will focus exclusively 
on Uber as it is by far the largest and most successful of these ridesharing companies.8      
Uber, a San Francisco-based company, was launched in 2010 by Travis Kalanick as a way to 
tackle the poor service that commuters faced using San Francisco taxicabs.  The company offers a 
range of ridesharing services that includes UberX, UberTaxi, UberXL and UberSUV.  UberX which was 
launched in 2012, is the largest of the services offered by Uber in North America.  The service allows 
drivers who are not otherwise holders of licenses for taxicabs or limousines to operate ridesharing 
services using their private cars.     
By accessing the Uber mobile application on their smart phones, private car owners can use 
their vehicles for transporting passengers.    Uber works by charging customers for the fare and upon 
completion of the ride, the customer’s credit or debit card is billed.   There is no exchange of cash 
between the driver and the passenger and there is no tipping.  Both the customer and the Uber driver 
using the Uber app can provide feedback in real time on the ride experience.  This feedback is used 
by Uber as part of the evaluation process for continuing to have a particular Uber driver as part of 
their team of drivers.   
                                                          
5 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-03/uber-raises-funding-at-62-5-valuation 
6 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-04/gm-invests-500-million-in-lyft-to-bolster-alliance-against-
uber 
7 http://Uber.com 
8 http://www.wsj.com/articles/icahn-takes-100-million-stake-in-lyft-1431698445 
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There are two very unique features of the Uber ride experience.  The first is that both parties 
(driver and passenger) know how the cost of the ride will be calculated as it is based on time, distance 
and demand (Uber’s dynamic pricing model).9  The dynamic pricing model is described as a “pricing 
strategy in which businesses set flexible prices for products or services based on current market 
demands.  Businesses are able to change prices based on algorithms that take into account 
competitor pricing, supply and demand, and other external factors in the market.”10  The second 
unique feature is that Uber riders, using the app, are able to track and locate the driver and can 
determine the exact pick-up location, even if the rider is in a busy urban environment.11 
   
1.2 The Regulatory Paradigm 
Across North America, municipalities, provinces and states have chosen to adopt various 
regulatory models to address the issues associated with ridesharing operations within their 
jurisdictions.  Over the few short years of the existence of ridesharing, three models have emerged 
among municipal, provincial and state governments for the regulation of ridesharing.12  The first 
model requires the company to observe the same licensing, insurance and regulatory requirements 
as other for-hire vehicles.   Also, in this model, regulators will typically ban or declare illegal, 
ridesharing operations that are unable to comply with the regulatory requirements of the jurisdiction.  
The second model sees the creation of a new class of licensees called “transportation network 
                                                          
9 Schneider, A. (2015). Uber Takes the Passing Lane: Disruptive Competition and Taxi-Livery Service Regulations. 
Elements: Boston College Undergraduate Research Journal, 11(2). 
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_pricing 
11 ibid 
12 http://files.ctctcdn.com/96235a6b201/5e962a41-27c3-49c8-935d-d221b715f191.pdf 
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companies” (TNCs) with a separate regulatory framework for taxicabs.  The third model is where 
municipalities have just allowed Uber to operate without regulatory oversight.13   
New York City is an example where the first model for regulating ridesharing companies is 
most apparent.  In New York City (NYC), the taxi industry is regulated by the New York City Taxi and 
Limousine Commission (TLC).  The TLC licenses and regulates various types of vehicles, which include 
not only medallion/yellow taxicabs, but also for-hire vehicles (FHVs) and boro taxis.14  FHVs consists 
of liveries also known as car services or community cars and provide for-hire vehicle services to the 
public through pre-arrangement.  They also include black cars which generally serve corporate clients 
on a prearranged basis and luxury limousines are also prearranged.   Boro taxis were created as a new 
class of license in 2012 to provide yellow cab service to the boroughs.  They are a hybrid service, 
providing both street-hail and prearranged for-hire vehicle services.15     The TLC also regulates 
paratransit which provides transportation for healthcare facilities and commuter vans for passengers 
along fixed routes.   
The TLC requires ridesharing companies to either become a TLC-licensed base to dispatch 
vehicles or work with an existing TLC-base to dispatch that base’s affiliated vehicles.  A licensed base 
is a TLC-licensed business that provides dispatch services for a particular type of TLC-licensed vehicle.  
This requirement means that passengers are allowed to arrange a service with FHVs through an app 
and the fare that is paid is done through the app as is the case with ridesharing services.  With respect 
to surge pricing, the TLC requires the company to ensure that the surge pricing is made known to the 
passenger at the start of the trip.  It is also a TLC requirement that a FHV has to have a privacy and 
                                                          
13 http://files.ctctcdn.com/96235a6b201/5e962a41-27c3-49c8-935d-d221b715f191.pdf 
14 N.Y.C., N.Y., ch. 52, §52-01 (2014) 
15 http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/2014_taxicab_fact_book.pdf 
       9  
 
security policy in place.16  Both yellow taxis and FHVs are required to have insurance liability coverage 
in the amount of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence and $200,000 in personal injury 
protection.  In addition, the  TLC  requires FHV drivers  to undergo the same vigorous background 
checks and accessibility as yellow taxis.   
As a result of the TLC requiring ridesharing companies like Uber to fit in with the existing 
regulations and to comply with the rules governing for-hire vehicle companies, the result has been 
the creation of a more level playing field for all players in the industry and the potential to foster a 
more competitive regulatory environment.    
The second regulatory model in effect in the United States occurs where a special class of 
license has been created to regulate ridesharing companies as “transportation network companies” 
(TNCs) with special laws governing their operations.    Some of these jurisdictions include Illinois, 
Nevada, Massachusetts and Washington D.C.  Uber has lobbied policymakers across North America 
to adopt the regulatory framework associated with this classification as the assumption is that it is 
intended to distinguish their operations from taxis and promotes the concept that Uber is a 
technology company whose main business is to connect people with rides.   
 In October 2014, the Washington D.C. Council passed legislation legalizing ridesharing 
services in that jurisdiction.17  The regulations in Washington D.C. were modeled off the concept that 
ridesharing services should be regulated as a separate licence class.  In Washington D.C., the impetus 
for moving quickly to design a regulatory framework to regulate ridesharing was the concerns by 
policymakers about public safety especially because policymakers were dissatisfied with Uber’s 
                                                          
16 http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/2016_tlc_factbook.pdf 
17 http://economics21.org/html/dc-leads-way-new-ridesharing-bill-1131.html 
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assurances regarding the background checks of their drivers as well as with the adequacy of the 
insurance coverage for these drivers.18  
Some of the requirements of The Vehicle-for-Hire Innovation Amendment Act (“VIAA”) are as 
follows: 
- a new class of licence called “private vehicle-for-hire” was created 
- drivers required to undergo a criminal background and sex offender database check on 
the federal, state and local level 
- vehicles are required to undergo a yearly inspection 
- ridesharing companies must register with the D.C. Taxi Commission   
- minimum insurance requirement which is higher than that for taxicabs 
- fares are not regulated but surge pricing is prohibited during states of emergency 
This legislation although not imposing the same regulations for taxicabs on the ridesharing 
service did apply some of the same regulatory features that were common to the taxicab industry 
such as background checks, minimum insurance requirements and vehicle inspections.   Uber has 
praised this legislation as the best regulatory framework for ridesharing services and has urged other 
municipalities to adopt this model.   Taxi drivers have however, criticized the legislation as being 
unfair to them and favourable to Uber.19 
Since the passage of these regulations, a number of other North American jurisdictions as 
well as the four Canadian municipalities studied in this research paper have enacted regulations that 
                                                          
18 https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/new-regulations-for-uber-and-lyft-open-the-
door-for-expansion/2015/02/21/8445149a-b83e-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html 
19 See Debra Alfarone, DC Council Passes Bill to Clear Way for Uber, Lyft, WUSA9 (October 28, 2014, 6:20PM), 
http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/2014/10/28/dc-taxi-drivers-protest-uber-vote/18044889/ 
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are similar to the Washington D.C. or TNC model.20  The similarities between the TNC model and the 
models adopted by the four Canadian municipalities will be discussed later in this paper.   
In a number of jurisdictions in North America Uber is allowed to operate unfettered and 
without regulatory oversight because the current regulatory framework which governs the operation 
of taxicabs have not yet caught up with the Uber business model.   Nevertheless, many large cities 
like Philadelphia, after allowing ridesharing companies to operate illegally for a number of years have 
now made the decision to pass regulations and/or reach agreements with these companies to 
regulate their activities.21   
 
1.3 Impact of ridesharing operations on the taxicab industry  
 One of the major concerns expressed by opponents of ridesharing is that if these businesses 
are allowed to operate without regulations that are similar to those that govern taxicabs, these 
services would flood the marketplace and this would result in an excess of transportation options 
which would not only depress wages but also reduce the value of the licenses that have been issued 
to these taxicab operators.   Over the years, the taxicab industry has thrived in an environment where 
there was the lack of competition from other players.   Municipalities place caps on the number of 
licenses that they issue in order to protect the taxi industry from oversupply and, until Uber’s entry, 
medallion or license values have been steadily increasing.   In the jurisdictions where ridesharing 
                                                          
20 http://documents.ottawa.ca/sites/documents.ottawa.ca/files/documents/case_studies_en.pdf 
21 http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2016/05/04/harrisburg-bill-uber-rideshare-committee-phily-
tax.html and http://siouxcityjournal.com/business/uber-gets-ok-to-operate-in-philadelphia-during-
convention/article_18fe71f2-350e-5351-b8ce-5b4e3b4cde8b.html 
       12  
 
services have been regulated, such as NYC and Washington D.C., there have been obvious impacts on 
medallion prices as well as in the number of trips that taxicab services now provide.    
In the Taxi and Limousine Regulations and Service Review- Case Studies document prepared 
for the City of Ottawa by KPMG LLP, there is an assessment of the impact of ridesharing operations 
on the existing taxicab industry in NYC.  One documented impact of the introduction of regulated 
ridesharing in the NYC taxicab industry has been the reduction in the value of yellow taxi medallions.    
In the summer of 2014, the average price of a NYC taxi medallion was $1 million.22   Taxi medallion 
values are investment opportunities for a large segment of the taxi industry and typically, because of 
the limit on the number of medallions issued by the regulatory authority these medallion prices 
appreciate in value.  However, in NYC, taxi medallion values are now falling and some are attributing 
this fall in the price to the entry of ridesharing companies in the taxi marketplace.23   Now the average 
price of a NYC taxi medallion in 2015 is now $690,000 down significantly from its value in just one 
year.24 
Another observation of the impact of ridesharing on the taxi marketplace has been a concern 
that these companies might be taking rides away from the taxicab business.   Some studies suggest 
that this might be the case, while other studies cannot find a correlation between Uber’s entry into 
the marketplace and the reduction in the number of rides by taxi drivers.  One study of the NYC data 
suggests that there is a correlation between Uber’s growth and a reduction in the demand for taxis.25   
                                                          
22Uber, T. Substitutes or Complements?(2015). Retrieved from Economist. com: http://www. economist. 
com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/taxis-v-uber. 
23 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/upshot/under-pressure-from-uber-taxi-medallion-prices-are-
plummeting.html?abt=0002&abg=0 
24 Ibid. 
25 Wallsten, S. (2015). The competitive effects of the sharing economy: how is Uber changing taxis?. Technology 
Policy Institute. 
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However, the study did also show that those in the taxi industry are adapting to the introduction of 
Uber by offering similar app services as Uber as well as taking other steps such as improving the 
quality of the ride experience in order to compete with Uber.  This could ultimately have the effect 
of levelling off the decline in taxi ridership. 
The Business Insider’s study found that in NYC although there has been a significant increase 
in the number of trips that Uber drivers are making, there is no conclusive evidence that this increase 
in trips and customers is coming at the expense of yellow taxis.26    The study suggests that commuters 
are still taking taxis in large numbers and are also accessing other modes of transportation, for 
example, subway rides in increased numbers as well.   
The Economist reports that although Uber has expanded tenfold over the past 2 years (2013 
-2015) whereby there were 300,000 rides in June 2013 compared to 3.5 million rides in June 2015, 
yellow cab rides have fallen by 2.1 million during the same period.  The data also shows that more 
passengers take Uber rides in the middle of the night as opposed to taxi cabs.  Taxi rides between 
11pm and 5am have fallen 22% since June 2013, whereas trips at all other times are only off by 12%.27  
During the period April 2012 to April 2015, the TLC reported a decline of 15.5% in the average number 
of taxi trips which they attribute partially to the growth of ridesharing in the city.28   
 Another issue of concern for policymakers and those in the taxicab industry is the 
apprehension that regularizing and legitimizing ridesharing would negatively impact the incomes of 
taxicab drivers.  As has previously been stated the taxicab industry is highly regulated and has been 
for a long time, primarily because it is one of the few industries that is susceptible to oversupply 
                                                          
26 http://www.businessinsider.com/taxis-beating-uber-and-lyft-in-new-york-city-2016-7 
27 Ibid. 
28 Harshberger, R. (2015, July 10).  “Yellow cab trips declining in NYC, according to TLC data.”  AM New York.  
http://www.amny.com/transit/nyc-yellow-cab-trips-on-the-decline-uber-to-blame-1.10627001 
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especially in an economic recession which has the effect of driving down wages.    Capping the number 
of taxi licences that are issued is one of the ways that regulators ensure that those engaged in the 
industry can make a liveable wage.    Wages for taxicab drivers in New York City have been estimated 
to be approximately $30,000 per year and Uber has said that its drivers in New York actually earn a 
median income of $90,000 a year.29  This number has been challenged by a number of researchers 
on this issue and Uber has actually been unable to accurately verify this number.30  
However, the statistics noted above show that the trend towards a decline in taxi ridership 
continues and the entry of ridesharing is contributing to this decline.  If this trend continues, there  
will be negative impacts on the wages of taxi drivers unless there are changes to the operating model 
of the taxi industry to make them competitive with these ridesharing services.  The marketplace 
transformation that is taking place also has political consequences.  Recently in NYC, Mayor Bill 
DeBlasio proposed capping the number of Uber vehicles in the city to deal ostensibly with traffic 
congestion.  This mayor has never been supportive of Uber’s operation and Uber through intense 
lobbying as well as an aggressive public relations campaign pushed back against the proposal.  The 
resulting uproar from the public caused the mayor and his supporters on city council to back away 
from the proposal.31   Uber is increasingly becoming more influential in the political realm and 
policymakers will have to be very mindful of this fact. 
 
 
                                                          
29 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/05/27/ubers-remarkable-growth-could-end-the-
era-of-poorly-paid-cab-drivers/ 
30 http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/02/09/uber-driver-earn-4-60-per-hour_n_9194868.html 
31 http://observer.com/2016/01/bill-de-blasios-quest-to-cap-uber-ends-with-a-whimper/  
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2.0 Policy diffusion  
2.1 Definition and concepts 
 In order to understand the relationship between policy diffusion and the enactment of 
ridesharing regulations in the four Canadian municipalities, it is important to explore the concepts 
and learnings from the policy diffusion literature and then apply those concepts to the study of the  
diffusion of ridesharing regulations in these four municipalities.  There are several authors and 
researchers in this area.   Some of the more prolific authors in this area are Charles Shipan, Volden, 
Gilardi, Maggetti and Nicholson-Crotty.  In discussing the literature on policy diffusion,  this paper will 
focus on the writings from these authors as some of the key findings from their research will be used 
to explain the diffusion of ridesharing regulations in the Canadian municipalities.    
Fabrizio Gilardi defines policy diffusion as a process in which policy choices are 
interdependent, that is, a choice made by one decision-maker influences the choices made by other 
decision-makers, and is in turn influenced by them.32   Simply put, policy diffusion occurs where one 
government’s policy choices are influenced by the choices of other governments.33  The decision to 
adopt a policy in one jurisdiction is usually shaped by the success or failure of that policy in another 
jurisdiction.34   For policy diffusion to exist there has to be some degree of interdependency because 
governments rely on their interconnectedness to aid in the development of  policy prescriptions.  As 
municipal, provincial and state governments in North America have similar governance and 
administrative structures as well as social and economic interactions this has contributed to their 
                                                          
32 Gilardi supra 
33 Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2012). Policy diffusion: Seven lessons for scholars and practitioners. Public 
Administration Review, 72(6), 788-796. 
34 Maggetti, M., & Gilardi, F. (2013, April). How Policies Spread: A Meta-Analysis of Diffusion Mechanisms. In ISA 
54th annual convention, San Francisco. 
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interdependency.    Globalization has also facilitated this interdependency because of the free 
movement of goods, services, culture and ideas amongst governments. The concept that policy 
diffusion is a product of interdependence is important to understand why the Canadian municipalities 
identified in this paper have adopted the particular regulatory framework discussed in this paper.35 
Some theorists of policy diffusion assert that learning, emulation or imitation, competition 
and coercion are the mechanisms that drive the spread of policies across different regions, countries 
and sectors.36  For policies to be spread by the learning process, a government has to be influenced 
by the policies of another government.  If the policy has been perceived as successful in one 
government, it is more likely that it will be adopted by another government.  In the learning 
environment, policymakers determine success from three dimensions:  a) the goals that the policy 
have been defined to achieve, b) the challenges of implementation and c) its political support.37     
Learning from successful policies seems to be more evident when multiple governments try the policy 
and also when the policy seems to affect larger segments of the society.38    Also, in learning the 
policymaker is focused on the policy itself and how it was adopted, whether it was effective and what 
were the political consequences.39 
Emulation or imitation occurs where policies are adopted whether they are successful or not.   
This involves copying the policies of another government regardless of the consequences and the 
lessons learned.  In other words, the adoption of the policy is not related to the objective 
                                                          
35 ibid 
36 Braun, D., Gilardi, F., Füglister, K., & Luyet, S. (2007). Ex pluribus unum: Integrating the different strands of policy 
diffusion theory. In Transfer, Diffusion und Konvergenz von Politiken (pp. 39-55). VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften. 
37 Maggetti, M., & Gilardi, F. (2016). Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of policy diffusion 
mechanisms. Journal of Public Policy,36(01), 87-107. 
38 Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2008). The mechanisms of policy diffusion. American journal of political 
science, 52(4), 840-857. 
39 ibid. 
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consequence of the policy.40  In emulation some policies will be adopted while other policies that are 
beneficial might be rejected simply because the policymaker is concerned only with what did this 
government do and how can we do the same.41   There are instances, however, where policies will 
be adopted because it simply responds to an issue that a government is dealing with.42  Shipan and 
Volden in their emulation hypothesis conclude that the likelihood of a city adopting a policy increases 
when its nearest bigger neighbour adopts the same policy.43   
Policies also diffuse through competition when there is a need for governments to attract or 
retain resources.  This is usually the case with tax policies.  Most policies related to competition 
usually take place in the context of governments needing to be attractive to investments and 
policymakers consider the economic effect of the adoption of a policy before agreeing to its 
implementation. In that context, if there are negative economic effects of a particular policy, then 
the government is less likely to adopt that policy.  However, if there are positive economic effects 
then the policy will in all likelihood be adopted.44    
A fourth mechanism of policy diffusion is coercion.  This tool of policy diffusion usually occurs 
at the national and international level and is most evident where one government coerces another 
government to adopt a policy through trade practices, economic sanctions or through international 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the United Nations.45    
                                                          
40 supra. 
41 supra 
42 42 Maggetti, M., & Gilardi, F. (2016). Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of policy diffusion 
mechanisms. Journal of Public Policy,36(01), 87-107. 
43 supra. 
44 Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2008). The mechanisms of policy diffusion. American journal of political science, 
52(4), 840-857. 
45 ibid. 
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Rogers identifies five main attributes of policy innovations that help determine the rates at 
which those policies are adopted by other governments.46  These attributes are relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, observability and triability.47  Rogers gave definitions to each of these 
attributes.  Relative advantage has been defined by Rogers as “the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes....[it is] a ration of expected benefits and costs 
of adoption”.   Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the 
existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters.”    Complexity is “the degree to 
which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to understand and use.”  Observability is “the 
degree to which results of an innovation are visible to others” and triability is “the degree to which 
an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis.”48 
The studies on the role that the characteristics of policies play in determining the speed at 
which those policies diffuse and the mechanisms through which this diffusion occurs has determined 
that the attributes of policy innovations do affect their likelihood of adoption and the nature of their 
diffusion. 49   The studies looked at 27 major criminal justice policies in the United States over a 30-
year period in the context of the major attributes outlined above.  The study found that all these 
factors affected the likelihood of policy adoption.50  Policies that have high relative advantages, high 
compatibility, low complexity, high observability and high triability spread across states at a greater 
rate and the converse was true.51   
                                                          
46 Rogers, E. M. (2010). Diffusion of innovations. Simon and Schuster. 
47 Makse, T., & Volden, C. (2011). The role of policy attributes in the diffusion of innovations. The Journal of Politics, 
73(01), 108-124. 
48 ibid. 
49 Makse, T., & Volden, C. (2011). The role of policy attributes in the diffusion of innovations. The Journal of Politics, 
73(01), 108-124. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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2.2 Key concepts arising from the literature on policy diffusion 
Charles Shipan and Craig Volden in their article entitled “Policy Diffusion:  Seven Lessons for 
Scholars and Practitioners” which was published in 2012, summarizes some of the key findings from 
the extensive literature on policy diffusion.    It is useful to look at some of the recent discussions on 
this issue for the purposes of applying some of the key lessons learned, to the policy diffusion that 
has occurred with respect to ridesharing regulations enacted in these four Canadian municipalities. 
 The first key lesson that the authors identify is that policy diffusion is not merely the 
geographic clustering of similar policies.   In other words, neighbour governments adopt the policies 
of other neighbouring governments.  This classic view of policy diffusion was first conceived by JL 
Walker in 1969.52   Important research since those first observations have now expanded this concept 
to show that policy diffusion is much more than that.   With the expansion of communication and 
travel, it is evident that the adoption of certain policy choices is not just limited to neighbouring 
jurisdictions.   
 The challenge of dealing with a new entrant into the taxi market has motivated municipal 
regulators to find regulations in other jurisdictions that they can adopt.  It is evident that policy 
diffusion impacted the two largest cities in the provinces of Alberta and Ontario.  Calgary and 
Edmonton were the first two to enact, within a few months of each other, similar ridesharing 
regulations.      The fact that they are the two largest municipalities in the province also speaks to the 
concept that policy diffusion is often seen in neighbouring jurisdictions.   The policy diffusion impact 
                                                          
52 Walker, J. L. (1969). The diffusion of innovations among the American states. American political science review, 
63(03), 880-899. 
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is also seen in the cities of Ottawa and Toronto where again, these two cities, the largest in the 
province of Ontario also passed similar regulations in the same month.   
 Another key lesson is that governments compete with each another to offer policies that are 
attractive to residents.  This has led to the concept of competition-based policy diffusion.  A number 
of the policy discussions at the state or provincial government level often look at identifying ways 
that these governments can either provide incentives and/or initiate programs that have worked in 
other jurisdictions that can move resources into their own jurisdictions.   
 Learning is a mechanism of policy diffusion and one of the key lessons learned from the policy 
diffusion is that governments learn from each other, not just regionally but nationally and 
internationally.   Shipan and Volden assert that the literature has shown that low-cost 
communication, travel and the number of professional organizations that have been formed within 
the last half century have allowed policymakers to gain extensive information about the various 
policies being instituted elsewhere that would otherwise not have been available in times past.    This 
has also facilitated the quick diffusion of policies across jurisdictions. 
 The literature on policy diffusion has also shown that it is not always beneficial as it can have 
negative impacts and results.   One of the negative results of policy diffusion is what the authors term 
as “a race to the bottom in certain redistributive programs”.  This occurs when governments opt for 
policies, learned from other jurisdictions, which have the effect of causing negative redistribution.   
Welfare programs are often affected by negative redistributive policies.  Another example of policy 
diffusion not always being beneficial is in the instance of policy imitation or emulation.  Policy 
imitation occurs when a policy is adopted not because it has any benefit or is suitable for the 
       21  
 
constituency or voting public where it is implemented, but simply because another government has 
implemented that policy.   
 The research from the literature also shows that a government’s capacity and policymaking 
capability will affect and influence the policy diffusion process.  The policy diffusion mechanisms that 
are used by a government will be related to their capacity.  For example, small towns and cities are 
more likely to use competition as a policymaking tool because of the fear that if they implement or 
not implement certain policies, they will lose out to their larger neighbouring competitors.53    The 
research also shows that governments that adopt policies later tend to have less policymaking 
capacity and this influences whether they take advantage of the learning opportunities associated 
with policy diffusion.54   
 The sixth lesson from the literature discusses the view that policy diffusion depends on the 
policies themselves in that the spread of a policy is dependent on the special characteristics or 
attributes of that policy.  The study showed that innovation attributes play a role in the diffusion of a 
process and complex policies spread more slowly while compatible policies spread more quickly.55 
 Finally, the seventh lesson from Shipan and Volden’s article is that decentralization is crucial 
for policy diffusion.  In other words, states and local governments are seen as better able to act as 
conduits of policy diffusion than national governments because they are able to learn from other 
governments (state and local) and they are affected by competitive pressures that force changes to 
public policies more quickly that it would at the national level.   
                                                          
53 Shipan, C. R., & Volden, C. (2012). Policy diffusion: Seven lessons for scholars and practitioners. Public 
Administration Review, 72(6), 788-796. 
54 ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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2.3 Learning and Policy Diffusion 
Although political scientists have been able to assess that there are four main instruments of 
policy diffusion, for the purposes of this research paper, learning will be looked at most closely to 
determine its impact as a tool of policy diffusion in the enactment of ridesharing regulations.  Various 
authors have looked at analyzing learning and its impact on the implementation of policies.  Other 
authors have examined learning to determine whether learning has an impact on how a policy is 
adopted and how quickly and/or how broadly is likely to diffuse.   
  Governments are concerned with the effectiveness of a policy and they often implement 
policies based on learning about its effectiveness in dealing with an issue.    Nicholson-Crotty argues 
that an assessment of the ability to implement an innovation is also likely to be a component of the 
learning process.56   Policymakers in this context are concerned with whether the policy was effective 
in the area where it was adopted and whether the policy can work in this jurisdiction.  From 
Nicholson-Crotty’s perspective policymakers are interested in not only understanding and learning 
about the effectiveness of a policy, but they are equally concerned about the impact of adopting that 
policy in their jurisdiction and this plays a significant role in how policies diffuse.   
Policymakers will also look at the conditions under which the policies that they are interested 
in adopting were implemented and then assess whether the same implementation conditions 
actually exist in their own jurisdictions.  If there is successful implementation in a particular 
jurisdiction, the success is easily measurable and the conditions of implementation in the adopting 
                                                          
56 Nicholson-Crotty, S., & Carley, S. (2015). Effectiveness, implementation, and policy diffusion or “Can we make 
that work for us?”  State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 1532440015588764. 
       23  
 
jurisdiction are similar, Nicholson-Crotty argues that the policy will most likely be adopted as part of 
the learning process of policy diffusion. 
Recent research with respect to learning as a tool of policy diffusion has looked into how 
political ideology affects policymakers’ willingness to learn from each other’s experiences.  The 
research has found that although ideology affects learning, ideological biases can be overcome if 
there is an emphasis on the policy’s success or on its adoption by other like-minded partisans in other 
communities.57   In the study the researchers focused on ideological similarities in the policymakers 
and that governments are likely to adopt policies that come from ideologically similar governments.  
Policymakers who have ideological or political leanings are less likely to seek out information that is 
adverse to that political ideology.  However, if information about the policy is made available to the 
policymaker and the policy’s perceived success can be identified, then this unexpected information 
will lead to learning and learning to policy adoption.58   
 
3.0 Regulating ridesharing in Canada 
3.1 Background of Uber’s operations in Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto 
In both Alberta and Ontario, municipalities are charged with the responsibility of regulating 
the taxicab industry and these municipalities all faced the same challenges when Uber decided to 
operate within these jurisdictions not having regard to the regulatory framework that governed the 
taxicab business.   These four Canadian municipalities operated with similar regulatory frameworks 
                                                          
57 Butler, D. M., Volden, C., Dynes, A. M., & Shor, B. (2015). Ideology, Learning, and Policy Diffusion: Experimental 
Evidence. American Journal of Political Science. 
58 ibid. 
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whereby there was a closed-entry system for new market entrants which saw a cap on the number 
of licences/permits issued in order to prevent the market from being flooded with taxicab drivers 
thereby depressing the value of licenses and lowering wages.    
These municipalities were selected for discussion in this research paper because they were 
the first municipalities in Canada to implement ridesharing regulations.  They are also the largest 
cities in the provinces of Ontario and Alberta and reflect the modus operandi of ridesharing services 
moving into jurisdictions with large urban populations and a closed entry system for taxi licenses.  
Further, these municipalities also experienced some of the same political and social upheavals that 
states such as NYC and Washington D.C. experienced when ridesharing services started operating in 
those jurisdictions.     
Table 1 highlights the similarities among the four municipalities with respect to the operation 
of the taxicab industry and the regulatory framework that governs their operations.    It is also 
important to note that in all four jurisdictions, the taxicab industry vehemently resisted Uber’s 
attempt to enter the marketplace and lobbied their elected officials to take significant steps to either 
regulate Uber in the same manner as taxicabs or place an outright ban on their operations. 
Uber’s first base of operations in Canada was in the city of Toronto in 2012.  The company 
then proceeded to set up operations in a number of Ontario municipalities as well as in other 
provinces.  There are four large Canadian municipalities that have implemented ridesharing 
regulations in their jurisdictions.    These municipalities are Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa.  
There are other jurisdictions such as Vancouver where Uber and other ridesharing services have not 
been welcomed.  In fact, the provincial regulators in Vancouver have imposed a minimum fare of $75 
on all ridesharing trips in the province and Uber has opted to pull its operations out of the jurisdiction.  
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Mississauga had instituted an outright ban on Uber’s operations, however, recently the city council 
opted to implement a pilot program that would allow ridesharing services to operate alongside 
taxicabs in the City.59     
 
Table 1:  Statistics on taxicab industry in four Canadian cities 
 Toronto Calgary Edmonton Ottawa 
Population 2,615,060 1,096,833 877,926 883,391 
Taxi Licenses 
issued 
4836 1659 1330 1188 
Open entry No No No No 
Regulated by 
municipality 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Taxis authorized 
to pick up 
throughout the 
city 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source:  City of Ottawa staff report and case study prepared by KPMG  LLP 
 
3.2 Edmonton’s experience 
Uber commenced operations in Edmonton in 2014 and as expected, the taxicab industry did 
not welcome its entry with open arms.  There were numerous demonstrations from taxicab drivers 
protesting Uber’s entry and demanding that the city’s elected officials take action against these 
companies.  Concerned about the political implications of the clamour for regulatory action, City 
Council directed staff to undertake a review of the taxi operations within Edmonton with a view to 
understanding the impact of these ridesharing services on the industry.   In January 2015, staff were 
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also directed to come up with a new vehicle-for-hire bylaw that took into account the business model 
of ridesharing services as well as the operation challenges faced by the traditional taxi industry.    
In January 2016, after the review was conducted and recommendations for a regulatory 
framework was presented to Council, Edmonton became the first municipality in Canada to regulate 
ridesharing.   Under the new Vehicle for Hire by-law, ridesharing companies such as Uber are now 
allowed to operate under a new class of licence called private transportation providers (PTPs).    
According to the staff report presented to Council: 
The new regulatory framework affords consumer choice and safe service for 
Edmontonians, while complying with provincial regulations. It supports a diversified 
economy and innovation in the industry, creating a model that enables the taxi 
business and ride sharing services to co-exist. 
The City strove to find the right balance between recognizing the long history of 
service by the taxi business and being responsive to innovation in the vehicle for hire 
industry. Changes to the industry will be closely monitored and adjustments made in 
the future, if necessary, to address potential issues, such as predatory pricing, that 
may have a negative impact.60 
 
3.3 Calgary’s experience 
Uber began operating in Calgary in October 2015 and was met with the same opposition from 
the local taxicab industry as it did in Edmonton.  City Council in response to the outcry by the taxicab 
drivers against Uber’s operation in that city directed that staff prepare amendments to the Livery 
Transport by-law to regulate ridesharing services.  In November 2015 and based on an application 
brought by the City of Calgary, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench issued a temporary injunction 
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barring unlicensed drivers of vehicles-for-hire from operating in Calgary.  Uber thereafter suspended 
its operations in that city.  Staff commissioned several studies to assess the impact of Uber’s 
operation in the City as well as whether it could co-exist with the taxicab industry within a new 
regulatory framework.   The City in February 2016 passed its new by-law which modelled in several 
respects the City of Edmonton’s bylaw.     
Subsequently Uber pulled out of both Edmonton and Calgary arguing that the regulations that 
were imposed by these municipalities made it impossible for them to continue operations in those 
jurisdictions.   Uber contended that the insurance requirement imposed was quite onerous and would 
make it too expensive for their drivers to continue to operate in those jurisdictions.  The province of 
Alberta recently approved a policy of insurance for ridesharing services and Uber announced that it 
would be returning to operations in Edmonton in July 1, 2016.   
 
3.4 Ottawa’s experience 
In the city of Ottawa, the regulations governing ridesharing came about after extensive 
consultation with the public and interested stakeholders.  KPMG LLP, the Mowat Centre at the 
University of Toronto, Hara Associates and Core Strategies Inc. conducted various studies and 
produced reports that examined the best options for regulating ridesharing.  They also presented 
options for revamping and modernizing the regulations governing the taxi industry.  The result was 
that city council in April 2016 adopted a new regulatory framework whereby a Vehicle-For-Hire bylaw 
was created that saw taxicabs and ridesharing services operating with the same regulatory 
requirements with few minor exceptions.    The City of Ottawa chose to adopt the approach 
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recommended by the Competition Bureau of Canada which advises municipal and provincial 
governments to allow ridesharing services to compete with the taxicab industry on the basis that 
“…greater competition benefits consumers in terms of lower prices, higher quality of service, 
increased consumer convenience, and higher levels of innovation.”61   This recommendation from the 
Competition Bureau was also adopted by the City of Edmonton and unsurprisingly the regulations 
governing ridesharing in Ottawa are similar to those in Edmonton. 
Interestingly, KPMG LLP in its report presented the city with case studies of various 
jurisdictions and an analysis of the appropriate regulatory framework for their municipality.  They 
looked at New York City, Washington D.C. and other large cities in the United States.  This common 
practice whereby municipalities look at other jurisdictions to help determine the appropriate policy 
prescriptions for their jurisdiction will be looked at in further detail later on in this paper.    
 
3.5 Uber’s operation in Toronto      
Toronto is Canada’s largest city.  Residents live, work and play in a large dense urban 
environment where there are significant limitations on parking and large numbers of these residents 
rely heavily on taxi and public transit as the main modes of transportation in and around the city.     
Recognizing the opportunities that ridesharing presented in this urban environment, Uber began 
operating in Toronto in 2012.  The basis of their service at that time was to connect passengers with 
municipally-licensed taxis and limousines through UberTaxi and UberBlack.  In 2014, Uber launched 
UberX in Toronto, which connects passengers with unlicensed personal vehicles.   
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UberX’s entry into the marketplace prompted those involved in the regulated taxicab industry 
to become concerned about the financial viability of their operations.  These concerns stemmed from 
the view by many in the taxicab industry that they were required to operate on a seemingly an uneven 
playing field and that the regulatory authorities were powerless to intervene.   City council, pressured 
by these concerns as well as concerns around public safety, determined that it was necessary to 
respond to Uber’s operation and commissioned a review of the ground transportation industry in the 
city.  The recommendations arising out of that review process outlined in the staff report were 
designed to “….refocus and reset the City’s approach to regulating the taxicab and limousine 
industries and to propose the regulation of (Private Transportation Companies) PTCs, aiming to 
establish an equitable and appropriate level of regulation that balances the interests of diverse 
stakeholders.  The proposed changes will remove constraints that have prevented the expansion of 
vehicle-for-hire services in the past, foster competitiveness, allow taxicabs and limousines to develop 
efficiencies, and reduce regulatory burdens.”62     
The city’s march to regulating ridesharing was not smooth.  Taxi drivers staged numerous 
protests against Uber’s operation in order to force city council to enact legislation that would regulate 
both taxis and ridesharing services in the same manner.63  Most of these protests had to do with taxi 
drivers involved in slowdowns that caused traffic in the city to become paralyzed.   The mayor was a 
proponent of allowing Uber to operate in the city and so, largely because of his influence in City 
Council,  in May 2016, the City of Toronto passed the Vehicle-For-Hire bylaw that effectively regulated 
taxicabs and ridesharing services in the same manner.64  An interesting feature of the debate over 
                                                          
62 http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2016/ls/bgrd/backgroundfile-91911.pdf 
63 http://globalnews.ca/news/2389591/traffic-slowdown-expected-as-toronto-taxi-drivers-stage-protest-against-
uber/ 
64 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/with-uber-john-tory-proves-he-can-make-torontos-
council-work/article29872330/ 
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this by-law was the comment from Uber recommending that the City adopt the regulatory approach 
of the City of Edmonton.  Another interesting takeaway from the report recommending adoption of 
the new regulatory framework is that city staff conducted a jurisdictional scan of the other 
municipalities in Canada to determine what steps they had taken to regulating ridesharing within 
their jurisdictions and although adopting some of the features of the Edmonton bylaw also made 
some significant changes as well.   
 
3.6 Similarities in the regulations 
 Policy diffusion has been most apparent when one looks at the similarities in the regulatory 
framework of TNCs in the United States and the regulations enacted in the four Canadian 
municipalities.  To illustrate the similarities, Table 2 details some of the common features of TNC 
regulations in place in jurisdictions in the United States.  There are obvious variations to this TNC 
model based on jurisdictions.  Table 3 illustrates that the TNC regulatory model was adopted by the 
four Canadian municipalities in that the regulations governed the creation of a separate licence class, 
the fares, insurance requirements, background checks for drivers, vehicle inspection requirements 
etc.     
 
Table 2:  Typical Transportation Network Company Regulations 
Requirement Details 
Business Licence TNCs to obtain permit or licence and pay applicable fee. 
Fare TNC fares are not regulated, though method of calculation to be  
disclosed to governing body.  
 
TNC charges a fare for the services provided to passengers and  
discloses: 
• Calculation method either on app or on website,  
• Applicable rates being charged and the option to receive  
 an estimated fare before committing to the transaction, 
• An electronic receipt to the passenger that 
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 includes origin destination of trip and total time and distance of trip and 
 itemization of fare paid. 
 
Insurance TNC maintains valid and current commercial liability insurance with a minimum 
liability amount of $1,000,000 (varies by jurisdiction) and file insurance certificate 
with governing body. 
 
Insurance must provide coverage for drivers and vehicles from the time the TNC app 
is turned on, to the time the driver turns off the app.  
 
TNC required to have insurance coverage in place regardless of whether a TNC driver 
maintains insurance adequate to cover any portion of the claim. 
 
TNC requires drivers to maintain commercial liability insurance coverage. 
 
Criminal Background 
Checks and Driving 
Checks 
Prior to permitting an individual to act as a TNC driver, TNC require driver to undergo 
criminal background check and driving check to ensure that minimum requirements 
are met. These thresholds vary across jurisdictions but would rule out drivers 
convicted of major violations and/or who exceed minimum number of demerit 
points. 
 
TNC driver results in these checks are made available to governing body upon request 
and audit. Where driver's status changes with TNC, or when a driver's criminal 
background check does not meet minimum thresholds, governing body is notified.  
 
Training TNC establishes a driver training program to ensure that all drivers are safely 
operating the vehicle prior to driver being able to offer the service and includes 
training on how to properly handle mobility devices and treat individuals with 
disabilities in a respectful manner.  
 
TNC makes the training program available to the governing body.  
 
Non-discrimination TNC to ensure that all drivers comply with all laws pertaining to non-discrimination 
against passengers based on pickup or drop-off destination,  
race, sex, age, disability, or usage of a service animal.  
 
TNC to include option for accessible vehicle and if accessible vehicle is not available, 
TNC to direct the passenger to an alternate provider of accessible service. 
 
TNC to ensure that the app and website rating system of the drivers/vehicle and 
passengers is not based on discrimination and includes the option for passengers to 
opt-out of the rating system from the outset of enrolling with the TNC app. 
 
Record Collection and 
Data Reporting 
TNC provides the governing body regular reports that include: 
• Number of new qualifying drivers. 
• Monthly trip records that include trips requested and fulfilled by geographic 
endpoints (i.e. 3-digit postal code) and date/time.  
• Trips not fulfilled with reason and geographic endpoints. 
• Complete complaint data. 
• Complete accident data related to TNC driver 
• Driver and transaction data: 
• All trips requested and fulfilled with driver name and plate numbers.  
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• Transactions, drivers, and trips including information relating to specific trips 
and/or drivers and/or vehicles that may be involved in an investigation by 
the City of Toronto 
 
Communication TNC to clearly disclose on the app and the website that TNCs facilitate rides between 
passengers and private drivers using their own personal vehicles. 
 
TNC valid insurance certificate to be made available on website and app. 
 
TNC to provide passengers with a photo of the driver, vehicle details, and the driver’s 
licence plate number on the app. 
 
Driver Requirements Prior to permitting an individual from becoming a TNC driver, TNC ensures that driver 
holds an unrestricted and fully privileged driver's licence. 
 
TNC drivers can only use TNC pre-arranged trips and not respond to street hails. 
 
TNC drivers to display TNC identifier that is visible from the exterior of the vehicle. 
This identifier is filed with the governing body.  
TNC is to be able to provide proof of both their personal insurance and the 
commercial insurance in the case of an accident. 
 
Vehicle Requirements TNCs to ensure that TNC drivers are using vehicles that are properly registered and 
regularly inspected by a licensed facility (frequency and criteria vary across 
jurisdictions). TNC to keep documentation of inspection reports and make them 
available to the governing body upon request. 
 
Source:  Attachment 1 – City of Toronto’s Ground Transportation Review Findings Report65 
 
 
Table 3:  Comparison of ridesharing regulations in Canadian cities 
Requirements Toronto 
 
Ottawa 
 
Edmonton Calgary 
PTC to Obtain 
Licence with City 
    
Accessibility 
Program in Place 
 
A PTC with 500 or 
more vehicles 
affiliated with its 
Platform must 
ensure that 
comparable (wait 
times and fares) 
accessible PTC 
services are made 
available to the 
public. 
Voluntary 
 
Voluntary per-ride 
accessibility 
surcharge. 
 
City will report 
back on the results 
of negotiations 
with PTCs and 
recommend 
process, and 
 
Commercial Private 
Transportation 
Providers (PTPs) 
required to pay a 
$20,000 annual 
dispatch accessibility 
surcharge or provide 
accessible services. 
 
× 
City is reporting 
back in Q3 on 
Phase 2 of their 
Accessible Taxi 
Review. 
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request the 
authority from the 
Ontario 
government to 
provide City ability 
to make an 
accessibility levy a 
mandatory 
requirement for 
PTCs. 
Local PTPs will be 
required to pay 
$50/car. 
 
This fund will be used 
towards a grant 
program. 
Driver Screening  
• City sets 
standards 
• City audits 
 
 
 
• City sets 
standards 
• City audits 
 
 
• City sets 
standards 
• City audits 
 
× 
• City sets 
standards 
• City conducts 
 
Certified Vehicle 
Inspection 
 
Annual Ministry of 
Transportation 
Safety Standards 
Certificate 
 
Ministry of 
Transportation 
Safety Standards 
Certificate annually 
if the vehicle is 5 
years old or less, or 
biannually vehicle 
is over 5 years old. 
 
Annual vehicle 
inspection by a 
licensed garage and 
mechanic 
 
Drivers to submit 
report of 134-point 
provincially-
approved 
mechanical 
inspection, 
annually or 50,000 
km, whichever 
comes first 
Insurance Required  
Liability insurance: 
$2,000,000 per 
occurrence 
 
Liability insurance: 
$5,000,000 per 
occurrence 
 
Liability insurance: 
$1,000,000 per 
occurrence 
 
Liability insurance: 
$1,000,000 per 
occurrence 
Regulated Fares × 
The rate must be 
clear to the 
customer in 
advance of 
accepting ride. 
 
× 
The rate must be 
clear to the 
customer in 
advance of 
accepting ride. 
 
× 
Minimum of $3.25 for 
any trip pre-arranged 
through a mobile app 
or written contract. 
× 
Calculate fare 
based on distance 
travelled or flat 
rate.   
The rate must be 
clear to the 
customer in 
advance of 
accepting ride. 
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Fees Collected by 
City 
 
PTCs application 
fee: 
• $20,000 
 
Annual licence fee: 
 
• $10 per PTC 
vehicle and 
• $.20 per trip 
originating in 
Toronto 
 
• Annual licence 
fee: 
• PTC with 1 to 
24 affiliated 
vehicles: $807 
• PTC with 25 to 
99 affiliated 
vehicles: 
$2,469 
• PTC with 100 
or more 
affiliated 
vehicles:  
$7,253 
and 
• per trip charge 
of $.105 
 
Commercial PTPs 
operating 200 or more 
vehicles: 
• Dispatch fee:  
$50,000/year 
• Per Trip Fee: 
$0.06 
• Vehicle /driver: 
$0 
 
Regional PTPs 
operating less than 
200 vehicles: 
• Dispatcher/Broker 
fee: $1,000/year 
• Vehicle: 
$400/year 
• Driver: $100/2 
years or $60/year 
 
 
Annual 
Transportation 
Network Company 
(TNC) licence fee:  
$1.753 
Annual driver 
licence fee:  $220 
Source:  Appendix 1 of City of Toronto staff report66 
 
4.0 Application of the concepts from the policy diffusion literature to the ridesharing 
regulations in Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto 
 
Although Uber started operating in Toronto before Edmonton, the policymakers in Edmonton 
were the first to enact regulations to govern Uber’s operation in that jurisdiction.  Notwithstanding 
that Edmonton was the first to actually pass ridesharing regulations, all four jurisdictions had 
directions from their respective councils to explore regulations geared at dealing with the ridesharing 
phenomenon and to report back to Council with recommendations.  Staff in those municipalities were 
tasked with conducting reviews of the regulatory framework for taxicabs as well as provide a 
jurisdictional scan of other municipalities in North America and elsewhere, to determine the most 
effective regulatory framework for  governing ridesharing in their respective jurisdictions.  The idea 
                                                          
66 http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2016/ls/bgrd/backgroundfile-91911.pdf 
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behind these activities was to learn about the policies that have been implemented and to determine 
the effectiveness of the ones that have had success.  The limitations that policymakers in these 
Canadian municipalities faced dealt mostly with the fact that the regulations had not been in place in 
other jurisdictions for a long enough period of time to enable a proper evaluation of their 
effectiveness. 
 One of the features of policy diffusion is the concept that where policies and their effects are 
highly observable, these policies are likely to be adopted.67   Because some jurisdictions in North 
America, such as, New York City, Boston, Chicago, Washington D.C. and San Francisco had ridesharing 
regulations in place for a few years,  this allowed the regulators in these four Canadian municipalities 
to look to these cities as examples of the types of regulations that could be used in their 
municipalities.     In a number of American jurisdictions, the new TNC licensing category allowed for 
ridesharing companies to also operate alongside the taxicab industry.   Staff in all four Canadian 
jurisdictions considered the jurisdictions that had the TNC regulatory model and adopted that policy 
framework as it best reflected regulations that allowed for the creation of a level regulatory playing 
field which was one of the key goals for these municipalities.68   
 
4.1 The impact of ideology on policy diffusion  
 The impact of the ideological position of policymakers on the diffusion of a particular policy 
is an important consideration in discussing the diffusion of ridesharing regulations in Canada.  As 
                                                          
67 Gilardi, F. (2010). Who learns from what in policy diffusion processes? American Journal of Political 
Science, 54(3), 650-666. 
68 http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ls/bgrd/backgroundfile-83503.pdf 
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discussed earlier in this paper, there is a school of thought in the policy diffusion literature that 
policymakers’ ideological positions and prior beliefs about the effectiveness of policies shape their 
predisposition towards the adoption of a particular policy.  One author on the subject suggests that 
“if policy makers prefer low unemployment benefits because they trust market mechanisms more 
than state intervention, then they are also likely to believe that such a policy has beneficial 
consequences on the unemployment rate.”69     Whilst it is true that policymakers at the municipal 
level in Canada do not identify by party affiliations, it is also true that their ideological leanings are 
often obvious because of the policy prescriptions that they propose when dealing with certain issues.  
This has been apparent in the case of the mayor of the city of Toronto, John Tory and his views on 
how to regulate ridesharing in the city of Toronto.   
 Mayor John Tory was elected in November 2014 and, prior to taking office made statements 
supportive of Uber’s operation in the city.  His position was that although Uber should not be allowed 
to operate outside of the regulations governing taxicabs, the taxi industry needed to recognize that 
Uber had a role to play in the market. 70   It was clear that prior to assuming elected office Mayor 
Tory’s ideological orientation was towards allowing market forces to dictate the transportation 
options that are available to the public and he was not open to banning Uber’s operation in the city.  
Based on his ideological predisposition, regulatory policies in other jurisdictions that allowed Uber to 
operate alongside the taxi industry would be the option that Mayor Tory was inclined to support.  
Therefore, the TNC regulatory model was the option that the city of Toronto pursued.  It also 
happened to be the same model that was in effect in Calgary and Edmonton where those councils 
                                                          
69 Gilardi, F. (2010). Who learns from what in policy diffusion processes?.American Journal of Political 
Science, 54(3), 650-666. 
70 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/uber-is-here-to-stay-toronto-mayor-elect-john-tory-says-1.2840295 
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also agreed that ridesharing should be allowed to operate in their jurisdictions, as long as it was on 
the same playing field with taxicabs.   
 
4.2 Impact of political consequences on policy diffusion 
Political consequences are also an important consideration when discussing learning as a tool 
in the policy diffusion process.   It is clear that policymakers and regulators consider the political and 
electoral consequences of implementing policies.  In most of these jurisdictions where ridesharing 
has been operating, the taxicab lobby has been very vocal and has engaged in sit-ins and 
demonstrations in council chambers as well as other type of protests.    However, what has become 
obvious to elected officials in Canada is that in jurisdictions such as NYC and Washington D.C. that 
have adopted ridesharing regulations, these protests ceased once the policies were adopted and 
these special interests groups recognized that some of their concerns were either considered as part 
of the policymaking process or actually incorporated in the enacted regulations.   The regulations in 
some of these American jurisdictions came into effect, in some instances, a full year before the 
Canadian municipalities considered passing ridesharing regulations.  Accordingly, the regulators in 
these Canadian municipalities were able to learn about the political consequences of the policy 
prescriptions and determined ways to navigate the political landscape using that knowledge.  
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4.3 Impact of implementation and effectiveness on policy diffusion 
 The ease at which a policy is implemented as well as its effectiveness will impact its 
adoption.71   Policymakers in the four Canadian municipalities determined that the TNC model was 
the most effective model for regulating ridesharing largely because the policies had been successfully 
implemented and had achieved their regulatory goals in jurisdictions in the United States.     
 As was discussed earlier, one of the impacts of ridesharing has been its effect on the number 
of trips made by taxi drivers.  Although, there is some evidence that ridesharing has had a negative 
effect on taxi trips, there is also evidence that its entry has resulted in improvements in the service 
provided by the taxicab industry.  Ridesharing regulations, especially the TNC model, have been 
aimed at allowing for market forces to determine consumer preferences.  In this respect ridesharing 
policies have been successful.  The successful implementation of ridesharing policies in some United 
States jurisdictions resulted in those policies being adopted by these four Canadian municipalities. 
  
4.4 Impact of professional organizations and lobbying groups on policy diffusion 
The influence and role of professional organizations and think tanks has been a factor in the 
diffusion of the regulatory policies governing ridesharing in these Canadian municipalities.  As Shipan 
and Volden have noted these bodies have facilitated diffusion by making information about policies 
available to policymakers who would otherwise not have access to these policy learnings.    
                                                          
71 Nicholson-Crotty, S., & Carley, S. (2015). Effectiveness, implementation, and policy diffusion or “Can we make 
that work for us?”. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 1532440015588764. 
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Policymakers not only look to jurisdictions to provide guidance and learning in the policy diffusion 
process but they also look to these organizations to assist in the learning process.   
One such organization in the province of Ontario is the Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario (AMO).  AMO is the public policy representative of the 444 municipalities in the province of 
Ontario and its mandate is to be the voice for municipalities on policy input and ideas so that 
municipalities are involved in the policymaking process at the provincial level.  AMO also provides 
policy support to municipal governments.  AMO has worked with the Mowat Centre to have 
discussions about the sharing economy and its impact on municipal governance.  One of those policy 
prescriptions which has been incorporated into the policy considerations by the policymakers in the 
four Canadian jurisdictions is the concept that keeping the status quo regulatory framework is ill-
suited for the sharing economy and that governments have to be more interventionist.72   
The Competition Bureau although not a professional association but a regulatory body, has 
also been influential in shaping the learning regarding the type of regulatory framework that would 
be suitable for Canadian municipalities.    The four municipalities in the reports to their respective 
Councils proposing new ridesharing regulations, identified certain key concepts that the Competition 
Bureau put forward in the Bureau’s White Paper entitled “Modernizing Regulation in the Canadian 
Taxi Industry and dated November 26, 2015.73   The Competition Bureau favours allowing ridesharing 
companies to operate in the local market without significant restraints that would have the effect of 
curtailing their operations.   From the Competition Bureau’s perspective, the regulatory regime 
should be “light” and that the taxi industry should also have the same “light” regulations as this would 
                                                          
72 https://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/106_policymaking_for_the_sharing_economy.pdf 
73 http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04007.html 
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contribute positively to a level regulatory playing field.74  In the White Paper, the Competition Bureau 
argues that regulations should also not protect certain special interest groups but should instead look 
at the existing regulatory framework operating in their jurisdiction to determine whether changes 
can be implemented that would incorporate this new business model.  The White Paper called for 
regulators to also consider making changes to the existing regulations governing  the taxi industry to 
also ensure that there was fairness and that onerous regulations were eliminated freeing the industry 
up to compete with the ridesharing services.75  
The effect of the guidance from the Competition Bureau has been that all four Canadian 
municipalities chose to adopt an approach from other jurisdictions where ridesharing companies 
operations were legitimized with a special licence class either as transportation network companies 
or for-hire vehicles.  A regulatory framework that was similar to that which obtained for taxicabs was 
also incorporated into the regulatory framework. 
 
4.5 Learning from each other 
Although this paper has looked at the learning that occurred from other jurisdictions in the 
United States, there is also evidence that these four Canadian municipalities also learned from each 
other when crafting the appropriate regulatory framework for their jurisdictions.    Since Edmonton 
was the first municipality to implement ridesharing regulations, one of the effects of being first is that 
other municipalities have the opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of the regulatory 
policies in Edmonton.   One of the obvious issues with the regulatory framework enacted by 
                                                          
74 ibid 
75 ibid 
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Edmonton was that an insurance product was not available to ridesharing companies in Alberta 
despite the fact that Edmonton required drivers to have insurance to cover their ridesharing 
operations.  Ridesharing companies in the province of Alberta had to await the approval by the 
province of the appropriate insurance product before their drivers could start legally operating in 
that jurisdiction – that did not happen until July 1, 2016.  As a result of learning from the experience 
of regulators in Edmonton and Calgary, the regulators in Toronto and Ottawa ensured that before 
regulations governing ridesharing were enacted, that there was at least one provincially-approved 
insurance product available to drivers involved in the ridesharing business.   
Another area of learning that occurred in the policy diffusion process with respect to 
ridesharing regulations is where Ottawa and Toronto did not adopt the fee structure enacted by 
Calgary because Uber found the fee structure in that jurisdiction to be unworkable and accordingly 
pulled their operations out of the city.   As promoting competition in the marketplace is a key 
component of the policy considerations put forward by the Competition Bureau, this move by Uber 
has had the effect of depriving the public in Calgary of other transportation options.  Invariably, 
Ottawa and Toronto learned from the failure of that regulatory requirement and ensured that the 
regulatory framework that they proposed had a more workable fare structure.  They achieved this by 
conducting extensive consultations with Uber representatives to ensure that the proposed scheme 
was workable and acceptable to them.76 
 
                                                          
76 http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2016/ls/bgrd/backgroundfile-91911.pdf 
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5.0 Research Conclusion 
 With the advent of ridesharing services in Canada, the cities of Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa 
and Toronto took the lead among Canadian municipalities to implement regulations to govern these 
operations within their jurisdictions.    The challenge for these municipal regulators was to allow for 
innovation while ensuring that the taxicab industry which is highly regulated could survive the 
disruption caused by the new entrants.   The expectation from these policymakers was to use 
regulations to transform the marketplace to accommodate all players. 
 This research paper looked at the regulatory framework currently in existence in certain 
North American jurisdictions and considered whether the regulations implemented by these four 
Canadian municipalities demonstrated the concept of policy diffusion.    The research shows that the 
regulatory model by these municipalities was the TNC regulatory model that existed in some 
jurisdictions in the United States.  The research also showed that although learning is an important 
driver of policy diffusion, policymakers as part of the learning process, are also concerned with the 
outcomes and effectiveness of the policies, the political consequences of the adoption of the policies, 
their ideological preferences as well as the capacity of the regulatory authority to adopt the policy.   
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